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CASE NOTES
a quirk in the anti-trust laws. It is suggested that a manufacturer wishing
to have price maintenance should do so by the safe method under state
fair trade laws.
JOSEPH L. COTTER
Constitutional Law—Ability of Domicile State to Tax Railway Rolling
Stock.—Central Ry. Co. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania'—Appellant is a Penn-
sylvania corporation licensed to operate a railroad only in Pennsylvania. It
owned 3,074 freight cars, upon which Pennsylvania had imposed an ad
valorem property tax. 2 Appellant, in protesting the tax, claimed that during
the tax year a daily average of more than 1,659 cars were entirely out-
side of Pennsylvania 3 and that 1,056 cars were used on lines which were
only partly in Pennsylvania, but was unable to show in which partic-
ular states the cars were Appellant argued that the imposition of an
unapportioned property tax on the property wholly or partly outside
the taxing jurisdiction was violative of the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution and the due process provisions of the Federal and Pennsylvania
Constitutions. On appeal from the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania ruled that property which was not shown to have had an
actual taxable situs elsewhere was subject to the taxing power of the
domiciliary state.5 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
HELD: Absent any showing of the freight cars' regular routes through or
habitual presence in particular non-domiciliary states, the domiciliary state
may tax the personal property in full.
1 370 U.S. 607 (1962).
2 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 72 § 1871 (1936) ; "Every Domestic corporation .. . shall be
subject to ... a tax at the rate of five mills upon each dollar of the actual value of its
whole capital stock of all kinds , „" Ibid. § 1901. "It shall be the duty of every corpora-
tion having capital stock ... to make annually ... a report ... setting forth . . , .
First. The amount of its capital stock at the close of the year for which report is made,
together with the highest selling price per share, and the average selling price thereof
during said year.
Fifth. Its real estate and tangible personal property, if any, owned and permanently
located outside of the Commonwealth, and value of the same; and the value of the
property, if any, exempt from taxation."
While the tax would seem more akin to a capital stock tax, the Court's consideration is
bound by the Pennsylvania Court's construction, Commonwealth v. Union Shipbuilding
Co., 271 Pa. 403, 114 AtI, 257 (1921), of its being the equivalent of a property tax. N.Y.
Central Ry. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 595 (1906).
3 Pursuant to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379 (1887),
as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(4)(10)(12) (1958), appellant had entered into an agreement
whereby its cars could be used by various other lines on a per diem rental basis. Appel-
lant was in somewhat of an awkward position, as it did not know exactly where the
individual cars had been; only that a particular out-of-state line had used them for a
designated number of rental days.
4 Appellant claimed that that stock which had been used by lines having a portion
of their trackage in Pennsylvania should be taxed by Pennsylvania in the same propor-
tion as the trackage in that state bears to the total trackage.
5 403 Pa. 419, 169 A.2d 878 (1961).
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While it can no longer be doubted that interstate business must pay its
way,° the type of taxation imposed by the various states must not be such that
interstate commerce bears a tax burden disproportionate to that of local com-
merce.? Thus, where property used in interstate commerce has acquired an
actual tax situs in one jurisdiction, other jurisdictions, may not impose a tax
which is inconsistent with the former jurisdiction's right to tax,' lest " [i]n-
terstate commerce . . . be subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to
which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause
forbids."° If it can be shown that the tax imposed by. the particular jurisdic-
tion will be exclusive of all other property taxes imposed by other
jurisdictions there is obviously no risk of the objectionable double burden."
Similarly, the state tax is not objectionable if it is fairly apportioned to the
use of the property within the state." There are two types of fact situations
which are of particular significance in a consideration of the power of a
domicile state to tax in full property used in interstate commerce.
Intangibles, being "but relationships between persons . . . which the Iaw
recognizes by attaching to them certain sanctions enforceable in court"" can
be subject to multiple taxation without violating due process. This result has
also been based omthe fact that as a practical matter, the intangibles, having
no situs, might otherwise escape taxation entirely. The same theory has been
applied to tangible property which has no definite situs: if the state of the
domicile of the owner is not permitted to tax, the property will be free from
taxation anywhere." Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania" established that
the habitual presence of railroad rolling stock in a non-domiciliary state,
despite the individual items of stock constantly changing in number and
identity, would justify a tax which was reasonably apportioned in relation to
the railroad's use of the state's facilities. N.Y. Central H. Ry. v. Miller"
refused to adopt a proposed corollary to Pullman, that if a certain average
percentage of rolling stock is in a non-domiciliary state,.the taxing power of
the domiciliary is pro tanto diminished. ,The language in Miller, however,
makes it quite apparent that the Court had misconstrued the facts and hold-
ing of Pullman. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Holmes stated that
0 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); Postal Tel.-Cable
Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252 (1919).
7 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
8
 Johnson OiI Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
9 Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).
10 Railway Express Co. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911) ; Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
11 American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 (1899); Pullman's Palace
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
12 Curry v. McCanles, 307 U.S. 357, 366 (1939).
13 Until the Miller case, infra note 15, the cases embodying this principle had dealt
with ships at sea, in which case the only contact the taxable property would have with
another taxing jurisdiction would be the entry into the various ports of call, which entry
is insufficient to establish a tax basis. It is interesting to note that such a tax is allowable
even though the taxing jurisdiction does not border the sea and will consequently never
have any actual contact with the tax property. Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, supra
note 10.
14 Supra note 11.
In Supra note 2.
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Pullman involved the same cars constantly in Pennsylvania jurisdiction. 16
The Pullman opinion seems to make it clear that it is the average number
of cars in the non-domiciliary state that establishes the tax basis, rather than
a requirement of the same cars being constantly present." Unfortunately, this
loose language in Miller has led to "occasional erroneous judicial intimation
or declaration,"18 to the effect that the constant presence in a particular
non-domicile jurisdiction is necessary for that jurisdiction to tax.' 9 The
speculation as to whether, on a correct consideration of Pullman's holding, the
Miller Court would have allowed the showing of the constant presence of an
average percentage of rolling stock outside of the domicile to require a
diminishing of the domicile's tax is given added weight by the circumstances
in which the Miller opinion was written. In the previous year, Union Re-
frigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky 2° had established, on a showing that only
one to three per cent of the railroad's cars were within the domicile state, that
the cars rented to out-of-state corporations were not subject to the taxing
power of the domicile state. In American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ha11, 2 '
ti a stipulation was made that the taxpayer's cars "never were run in [a non-
domiciliary state] in fixed numbers nor at regular times nor as a regular
part of particular trains" and were "only transiently present in said state."
Nevertheless, it was determined that the non-domiciliary could tax the
average amount of cars in the state even though it might occur that on a
particular day no cars would be in the taxing jurisdiction. As Miller did not
feel compelled to distinguish these prior decisions, it can only be assumed
that the two are not inconsistent. One possible basis for compatibility is the
fact that in Miller there was a showing that the particular rolling stock was
in the domicile state for part of the tax year. 22
 The dispute between the
18
 "But in that case . . . [Otte same cars were constantly receiving the protection
of the State and, therefore, it was just that the state should tax a proportion of them."
Id. at 597.
17 "[P]articular cars may not remain within the State; but the company has at all
times substantially the same number of cars within the State. . . ." This position is con-
firmed by Braniff Airways, Inc, v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954), where planes
regularly using the facilities of Nebraska were taxed even though not always the same
specific planes were present. The Miller requirement of a "continuous average" in the non-
domiciliary state is self-contradictory. See T. A:Powell, Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota,
57 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1107 (1944).
18 Powell, supra note 17, at 1098.
18 E.g., Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292,
298 (1944). "But no judicial restriction has been applied against the domiciliary State
except when property (or a portion of fungible units) is permanently situated in a State
other than the domiciliary State. And permanently means continuously throughout the
year, not a fraction thereof, whether days or weeks. Such was the unanimous decision
in the Miller case or Miller decided nothing." It is interesting to see how this view
was apparently altered in the subsequent Peck case where Mr. Justice Frankfurter par-
ticipated but failed to dissent from the Court's position that property traveling between
various other jurisdictions could not be taxed in full by the domicile. See infra note 27.
28 199 U.S. 194 (1905),
21 174 U.S. 70 (1899).
22 "We must assume, further, that no part of the corporate property in question
was outside of the state during the whole tax year." N.Y. Central v. Miller, supra note
2, at 595. Even this basis of compatibility would be destroyed by Peck, infra note 23, as
the property in that case was located for a limited time within the domicile state.
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majority and dissenting opinions in the instant case seems not to be whether
Miller still validly stands for the proposition that personal property, lacking
any showing of a definite tax situs elsewhere, is subject to taxation in full at
the domicile, but is, rather, the extent to which one must go to show a tax
situs elsewhere.
Since the Miller decision there has frequently been language to the
effect that the ability of a state to tax is limited to a corresponding relation
to the opportunities, benefits or protection which the taxing state gives the
property.23 This has been applied to both domiciliary 24 and non-domiciliary
states.25
 There also seems to have been fostered a rationale that, unlike those
tangibles which by their nature could not acquire a situs elsewhere, 2° river
boats and railway rolling stock must necessarily be in some taxing jurisdic-
tion, either the domicile's or elsewhere, and, therefore, any tax by one state
must be compatible with the ability of the other to tax. Thus Standard Oil
Co. v. Peck disregarded the holdings of Miller and Northwest that the
domicile could tax personal property in full unless a defined part of the
domiciliary corpus had acquired a taxable situs in a particular jurisdiction. 27
The Court held that the mere showing that the property was in some other
undesignated taxing jurisdictions precluded the domicile state from taxing it
in full.26 Similarly in Johnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma 29
 on a showing that cars,
in making trips from refineries in Oklahoma to a plant at the domicile state,
23 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Standard Oil
v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1953).
24 Standard Oil v. Peck, supra note 23.
25. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., supra note 23; Ott v. Mississippi
Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169 (1949); Johnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, supra note 8.
26 Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky,.supra note 13.
27 "[Miller and Northwest] have no application here since most, if not all, of the
barges and boats which Ohio has taxed were almost continuously outside Ohio during
the taxable year. No one vessel may have been continuously in another state during the
taxable year. But we do know that most, if not all, of them were operating in other
waters and therefore under Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., supra, could be taxed by
the several states on an apportionment basis." Standard Oil v. Peck, supra note 23, at 384.
28 This rationale of Peck was adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Flying
Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, .51 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 323 (1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959), over a strong dissenting opinion that a taxable situs cannot
be assumed to have been acquired on the mere showing of absence from the jurisdiction.
51 Cal, 2d at 327, 333 P.2d at 331.
The instant case's attempt at reconciliation with Peck by claiming that the facts of
Peck show a tax situs elsewhere does not seem justified by the record in Peck. This
record did not show the location of the particular riverboats in any specific state, but
only indicated the barrel mileage of the interstate routes traveled by the various river-
boats. Record, p. 102. See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Minton:
In the case at hand, the vessels had not acquired a situs for taxation in any other
state. They were at large in the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, touching ports
therein from time to time. There was no showing as to how much time any
of the vessels spent in any state. Indeed, the time spent in any state by the
vessels plying the Mississippi could not be shown with any accuracy, as the
states on each side own to the middle of the stream. The navigation channel
might be on either side of the center line or right on the center line. Who is
to say what state the vessels are in?
342 U.S. at 386.
20 Supra note 8.
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Illinois, spent only a minimal time in Illinois, the Court in denying Okla-
homa's right to tax in full, stated that the taxable situs was neither in Illinois
nor in Oklahoma and was presumably to be allocated to the remaining states
over which the cars ran on their various routes from the refineries to
Illinois. The Court did not consider whether there was a sufficient showing of
a situs elsewhere; from the nature of rolling stock, it seems to have assumed
the presence of a situs elsewhere.
It is upon such a history of confusion caused by loose language and
seemingly conflicting opinions that the present case arose. The Court's
strong reliance on Miller in a fact situation where Miller is possibly
distinguishable, particularly in view of the recent restrictions by implica-
tion on Miller, cannot but add confusion to the area. The Court's require-
ment of a showing of a fixed and regular route in specific non-domiciliary
states to establish a tax situs there is inconsistent with Ott,3° Union Refrigera-
torn and Johnson.32 Logically, it would seem the Court's reasoning that
the presence of a fixed and regular route, without a showing of the time spent
in each state, is indicative of a tax situs elsewhere, whereas a showing that
the property was constantly moving on other lines is not so indicative, is
unsound. As a practical matter the Court seems to think that the likelihood
of being taxed elsewhere is greater on a fixed route than on routes constantly
changing with the demands of the industry. As prior cases show, and as the
Court must admit, the appellant's cars might be located through the ingenuity
of the tax collector regardless of the taxpayer's ignorance of their exact
location. It is therefore submitted that a situation in which the taxpayer
is on a fixed route but irregular schedules (Peck) would not increase the like-
lihood of non-domicile taxation any more than would the constant but ir-
regular movement through other tax jurisdictions (Central).
There is thus presented the question whether the mere possibility of
double taxation is enough to violate the commerce clause. It would seem
that the mere exposure to the risk of a double tax burden would be forbidden
by the commerce clause. 33 The fact that another state actually does or does
not impose a tax on the property is immaterial 34
 It is "the risk of multiple
taxation [which] creates the unconstitutional burden which actual taxation
by both states would impose in fact." 35 Since this risk of double taxation is
30 ". . there was no showing that the particular portion of the property sought
to be taxed was regularly and habitually used and employed in Louisiana for the whole
of the tax year." 336 U.S. at 175.
31	 , and said cars never were run in said State in fixed numbers nor at regular
times . . . ." 177 U.S. at 153.
32 Supra note 8. "
33
 "The rule which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportionment
basis precludes taxation of all of the property by the state of the domicile." Standard
Oil v. Peck, supra note 23, at 384; see also Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, supra note 9.
34 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, supra note 19.
35 Separate opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge, International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of
Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 360 (1944). But cf. the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Black
in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Stoma, supra note 8, at 316, and in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v.
Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 442 (1939), "If there are limits to that power [of a state to tax
gross receipts], there is no need to mark them now. It will be time enough to mark them
when a taxpayer paying in the state of origin is compelled to pay again in the state of
destination." Id. at 445.
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constantly present with respect to personal property which must pass its
time in other taxing jurisdictions," a standard should be formulated which
allows consideration of the practical risk involved rather than, as the instant
case seems to do, allow a full tax by the domicile in a fact situation which,
as a practical matter, presents no greater danger of the offensive double
taxation than did previous situations where the full domicile tax was
denied. 37
JOHN D. O'REILLY, III
Contracts—Impossibility Occurring after Breach Limits Damages.—
Model Vending, Inc. v. Stanisci.'—Plaintiff and defendant entered into a
written agreement whereby plaintiff was to have the exclusive right to
place vending machines in defendant's bowling alley for a period of five
years. Eleven months later defendant breached the contract by commencing
to sell similar merchandise at his newly established snack bar. Plaintiff
filed suit for breach of contract and resulting damages for loss of profits
for the entire term of the contract, but while the suit was pending 2 de-
fendant's bowling alley was destroyed by fire. HELD: The destruction of
the premises on which the contract was to be performed made the contract
impossible of performance as of that date, and although defendant had
breached the contract before the fire, plaintiff was entitled to recover only
for loss of profits up to the time of the fire and not for the entire term of
the contract. 3
Full damages have been recovered when the promisor's breach causes
the loss resulting from the supervening impossibility to shift to the promisee.
Thus, in Mills v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America"' full damages were
recovered against defendant subcontractor's surety when, after breach by
the subcontractor and the consequent resumption of certain bridgework
by the plaintiff, the bridgework was destroyed by fire. The court said,
"While the high water was the immediate cause of the loss, he would not
have been placed in the position to have incurred the loss had it not been
for the wrongful act of the Metal Products Company."5
The instant court, finding no precedent in New Jersey,° gathered sup-
35 Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., supra note 25; Standard Oil v. Peck,
supra note 23, at 384.
37 Standard Oil v. Peck, supra note 23,
74 N.J. Super. 12, 180 A.2d 393 (1962).
2 See Brief for Defendant, p. 1.
3 The following articles are of particular interest on the general topic: Conlon,
The Doctrine of Frustration as Applied to Contracts, 70 U. Pa. L. Rev. 87 (1922);
Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 Mich. L.
Rev. 589 (1920); Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 Colum. L. Rev.
903, 943 (1942) ; Smith, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Con-
solidation, 58 Colum. L, Rev. 287, 307 (1958).
4 114 W.Va. 263, 171 S.E. 532 (1933).
5 Ibid.
6 The court was perhaps moved by the decision in Von Waldheim v. Englewood
Heights Estates, 115 N.J.L. 220, 179 Atl• 19 (1935), where plaintiff, a defaulting buyer
under an installment contract for the sale of real estate, was held entitled to a return
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